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COORDINATION AND CONFLICT:
THE PERSISTENT RELEVANCE OF
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION
ROBERT B. AHDIEH*
I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, scholarly enthusiasm about transnational
regulatory networks has experienced something of a boom-and-bust cycle. Such
networks—informal groupings of mid-level national officials, convened to
develop nonbinding “soft law” norms of behavior in specialized fields of
regulation—were identified as an important new phenomenon, were studied
widely, and came to be seen as central pillars of the international legal order.
Yet today, regulatory networks go largely unmentioned in polite academic
conversation: a kind of “he-who-must-not-be-named” of international law.
1
In the work of Kal Raustiala, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and David Zaring —
who drew on Bob Keohane and Joseph Nye’s study of “transgovernmental
2
relations,” and who were later joined by Janet Koven Levit, Charles
3
Whitehead, and others —transnational regulatory networks were foregrounded
as a distinctive framework of transnational governance, falling somewhere
between treaty-based international organizations and one-off incidents of
international cooperation. Particularly in the realm of international financial
Copyright © 2015 by Robert B. Ahdieh.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Vice Dean & K.H. Gyr Professor of Private International Law, Emory University School of
Law. My thanks to Anu Bradford, Reeve Bull, Neysun Mahboubi, David Zaring, and participants at
the Institute for International Law and Justice’s Symposium on New Approaches to International
Regulatory Cooperation, at New York University School of Law, for their helpful insights and counsel.
I am also grateful to James Kim for his invaluable research assistance.
1. See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (highlighting
transgovernmental networks as a distinctive framework of transnational governance); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (same); David
Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory
Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998) (same).
2. See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974) (exploring the distinct importance of
“transgovernmental” interactions in international relations).
3. See generally Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005) (analyzing growth of
transnational governance); Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals,
and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695 (2006) (same).

AHDIEH_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

76

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/14/2016 1:22 PM

[Vol. 78:75

regulation—where an alphabet soup of transnational regulatory networks,
including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Action
Task Force, the Financial Stability Forum, the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors, and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) were busy at work—scholars and practitioners alike
came to see networks as essential sources of international order.
In her seminal study of transnational regulatory networks, A New World
Order, Slaughter took the theretofore largely descriptive literature of networks
4
a step further, casting them as a solution to the paradox of globalization.
Engaging the unavoidable challenges that globalization has forced upon us,
while avoiding the dangers of world government, networks emerge in
Slaughter’s account as the optimal means of collective action in a shrinking
world.
As dramatically as networks emerged as a mainstay in the study of
international order, however, they fell from grace just as quickly. Consider a bit
of modest empirics: after a decade of growth in law journal references to
“transnational networks,” “transgovernmental networks,” and “regulatory
networks,” such mentions peaked in 2010. In the years since, they have been in
5
steady decline.
In no small part, this change can be traced to the financial crisis that swept
the globe in 2008. As David Zaring has highlighted, transnational regulatory
networks did not play a significant role in either preventing or responding to the
6
financial crisis. In many areas of international relations, where networks have
never been seen to play a central role, this might be of little note. The marginal
relevance of networks to the financial crisis, by contrast, constituted a fairly
damning critique of their utility, given longstanding emphasis on the financial
market’s regulatory networks as preeminent exemplars of the role that
networks could play. Adding insult to this injury was the close nexus between
the specific mandates of the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Forum,
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, IOSCO, and other
regulatory networks, and precisely the type of risk exposures and systemic
market failures that characterized the financial crisis.
But the Thermidor of the transnational regulatory network “revolution”
arises out of a broader and more foundational set of critiques than simply the
failure of networks to save us from the financial crisis. This brief article engaged
one among those challenges to the utility of transnational regulatory networks
in global governance. In important recent work, scholars have questioned the
ability of networks to play a meaningful role when relevant national preferences

4. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
5. Author’s calculation based on search of Westlaw Law Reviews and Journals database (Feb. 26,
2015) (on file with author).
6. See generally David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L.
475, 478–86 (2010).
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7

are in conflict. Whatever capacity regulatory networks might have where
interests are aligned, the argument goes, they have little to offer in the far more
widespread universe of situations in which nations disagree.
In significant part, this critique has been grounded on invocations of game
theory—a longstanding source of insight into international relations and
8
governance. But challenges to the relevance of transnational regulatory
networks in the face of conflict misunderstand the lessons of game theory.
Contrary to what may be emerging as the conventional wisdom, game theory
actually helps to suggest why networks can play an important role in settings
characterized by conflict.
Rather than simply an exercise in applied mathematics, however, an
understanding of the capacity of networks to help regulate the international
financial markets has important implications for questions of institutional
design. Especially since the financial crisis, scholars and policymakers have
debated the optimal institutional framework for international financial
9
regulation. One might array the universe of choices along a spectrum ranging
from highly formalized international institutions with significant political and
legal authority, to ad hoc and informal agreements that address a single issue of
bilateral concern. In between, one might variously situate high-level political
gatherings such as the G-7 or G-20; hard law agreements established by
multilateral or bilateral treaty, but lacking any institutional structure; and, of
10
course, transnational regulatory networks.
From the crucible of the financial crisis, observers have drawn divergent
conclusions as to the choice among these alternatives. Some have argued for the
need to create a “World Financial Organization” akin to the World Trade
11
Organization. Others have called for increased treaty making in the field of
12
financial regulation, but without the creation of new institutional structures.
And yet others see regionalism and ad hoc coordination as the best that can be
13
hoped for. Each of these positions may have its merits. To the extent it relies

7. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327 (2010);
Matthew C. Turk, Reframing International Financial Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis:
Rational States and Interdependence, Not Regulatory Networks and Soft Law, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59
(2014); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L
L. 113 (2009).
8. See Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY 28 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (explaining utility of game theory in the study of
international relations).
9. See, e.g., Giulio Napolitano, The Two Ways of Global Governance After the Financial Crisis:
Multilateralism Versus Cooperation Among Governments, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 310 (2011).
10. See Turk, supra note 7, at 71–72 (reviewing variety of institutions at work in international
financial regulation).
11. See, e.g., Barry J. Eichengreen, Out of the Box Thoughts About the International Financial
Architecture (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/116, 2009).
12. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 366–70 (arguing for the creation of a World Financial
Organization).
13. See generally Turk, supra note 7, at 115–18.
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on the incapacity of networks to navigate conflict, however, it is grounded in
false premises. As a new architecture of international financial regulation is
built in the coming years, policymakers should not abandon the role of
transnational regulatory networks without reason.
The argument herein is thus a modest one: the capacity of transnational
regulatory networks to play a central role in global governance—whether in
international financial regulation or elsewhere—should not be dismissed merely
because relevant national interests are not aligned. Conflict alone does not
14
obviate the role of networks.
By contrast, the argument is not that networks are invariably effective in the
face of conflict, nor more generally—including by comparison with more formal
institutions. In fact, formal institutions may be crucial in navigating certain
forms of transnational conflict. Nor does this article embrace the defense of
networks as apolitical decision-making structures, operating separate and apart
15
from the policy preferences of their national members. Various critiques of the
16
efficacy of networks may thus be justified, and it is clearly correct that distinct
circumstances will dictate a broader or narrower role for transnational
17
networks.
Part II of this article frames the operative challenge to networks, reviewing
the critiques of transnational regulatory networks offered by two leading
scholars of international financial regulation: Chris Brummer and Pierre
Verdier. Specifically, it highlights the distinction these scholars draw between
strategic settings that are in the nature of coordination games, in which they see
networks as having an impact, versus the more familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma and
other conflictual game settings, in which they see networks as incapable of
having any meaningful role.
Part III reveals this dichotomous account of network utility to be false.
After reviewing the basic dynamics of coordination, part III highlights the ways
in which the key characteristics of coordination can persist, even in the face of
significant conflicts between the preferences of relevant players, as
demonstrated by Thomas Schelling more than a half-century ago. On the
foundation of that more robust account of the nature of coordination, part IV
points to an array of ways in which transnational regulatory networks might
play an important role even when national interests are in conflict—over
divergent accounting standards; varying enforcement priorities; the relative
dominance of international financial centers, including as between developed

14. To be fair, Verdier emphasizes that he does not intend to dismiss the role of networks
completely. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 116–17. This article seeks to push back, however, on the
argument he offers for significantly limiting their role.
15. Cf. id. at 116 (explaining that networks should not be viewed as apolitical structures).
16. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives: Networks, Salience, and Institutional Design
in Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2010) (suggesting a particular critique of the role of
networks amidst financial crises).
17. See generally Brummer, supra note 7, at 354–55, 362–63.

AHDIEH_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2015]

COORDINATION AND CONFLICT

1/14/2016 1:22 PM

79

markets and offshore financial centers; or otherwise. Finally, part V focuses on
the setting of international financial regulation specifically, identifying
particular dynamics of coordination as to which transnational regulatory
networks might contribute, or are already doing so.
II
THE LIMITS OF NETWORKS IN CONFLICT
After an extended run of nearly universal praise for their role in
international relations generally, and especially in international financial
regulation, transnational regulatory networks have hit something of a wall in
recent years. In part, this can be traced to the global financial crisis, where
networks played a far more modest role than might have been expected. But
the real critique of transnational regulatory networks runs deeper than the
crisis, to question the utility of networks more fundamentally.
In a pair of articles published on the tail end of the financial crisis, Chris
Brummer and Pierre Verdier—leading scholars of financial regulation,
especially of the transnational variety—questioned the euphoria that had long
18
characterized the study of transnational regulatory networks. In overlapping
but distinct ways, each posited that widespread faith in networks as a
centerpiece of the transnational legal order was misplaced. In most real-world
19
circumstances, they argued, networks could not be helpful.
Starting from an intimate awareness of the international undertakings of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission—and particularly its aspirations to
increased harmonization in securities law—Brummer argues that theories of
“transgovernmentalism” fail to engage the full complexity of international
20
financial regulation today. The challenges of today’s financial markets, he
suggests, go beyond information asymmetries or a lack of trust: the types of
issues that can be addressed by way of non-coercive regulatory networks
focused on dialogue and an expanding web of bilateral memoranda of
understanding. Rather, “conflicting regulatory philosophies . . . , differing costs
of adjust[ment], and competition among financial centers” also stand in the way
21
of any effective regime of transnational financial regulation.
Given the sharply contrasting competitive strategies preferred by developed
economies versus offshore financial centers, for example, it is difficult to
22
envision a dynamic of voluntary harmonization that could bring them together.
Whereas the former seek to offer a framework of stringent rules, and thereby

18. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330–31; Verdier, supra note 7, at 114–15.
19. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 327–33; Verdier, supra note 7, at 114–18. Echoing Brummer and
Verdier’s criticisms, others have joined in questioning the capacity of networks to manage conflict. See,
e.g., Turk, supra note 7.
20. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330 (using the term “transgovernmentalism” to capture theories
of transnational regulatory networks as central to the international legal order).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 353.
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serve a bonding function, the latter aim to meet the demand for minimal
23
constraint, transparency, and liability. The costs of adjustment, meanwhile, are
both unevenly distributed, given that any point of convergence is likely to more
closely approximate the regime of one jurisdiction than another, and more
readily managed in those jurisdictions with an elaborate regulatory regime
24
already in place.
To address such conflicting interests, Brummer argues, transnational
regulatory networks, as distinct from more exclusive, more coercive, and
25
otherwise more forceful institutional structures, cannot suffice. In place of
transnational networks, therefore, Brummer counsels increased reliance on
26
what he terms “governmental clubs.” More exclusive in their membership than
many transnational regulatory networks, and operating across multiple
functional areas of regulation, Brummer sees such clubs as better suited to
navigate the conflict-laden landscape of international financial regulation today.
Taking on transnational regulatory networks even more directly, Verdier
suggests a limited role, if any, for networks in the face of “distributional” issues
27
among relevant national jurisdictions. In line with Brummer’s concern about
varying adjustment costs, Verdier questions whether networks can effectively
navigate the distinct impact of alternative regulatory choices on one jurisdiction
28
versus another. Thus, although networks might help to harmonize antifraud
regulations among developed economies given those countries’ relatively
aligned interests, networks cannot effectively navigate the conflicting interests
between those nations and various offshore financial centers. For offshore
financial centers, it is precisely the relative laxity of investor protection that they
rely upon.
National authorities can sometimes navigate such distributional imbalances
29
by means of side payments. In the case of offshore financial centers, for
example, some portion of the surplus generated for developed nations by
harmonization of securities fraud rules might be channeled to those offshore
centers that bear the costs of such changes, via subsidies to some other sector in

23. See id.
24. See id. at 351.
25. Cf. id. at 364 (describing a shift away from traditional networks in international financial
regulation).
26. See id. at 364–66. Brummer highlights two examples of such clubs: First, the Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding developed by IOSCO, which the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission has promoted as a means to impose enforcement cooperation among those jurisdictions
committed to a higher standard of securities regulation—in some contrast with network frameworks
open to all comers. See id. at 366–67. Second, the bilateral framework of “mutual recognition,” by
which the Commission would accept the regulatory regime of selected jurisdictions as a surrogate for
the imposition of U.S. rules. See id. at 368. It bears noting, however, that the Multilateral Memorandum
of Understanding, with its genesis in IOSCO, is seen by many as a traditional network institution. See
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
27. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 124–25.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 124–25, 128.
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need. But this possibility only presents itself when relevant negotiations occur
across multiple issue areas. In Verdier’s account of transnational regulatory
networks, however, networks lack such cross-functionality, thus limiting their
30
ability to offer side payments.
Beyond networks’ inability to navigate distributional issues, Verdier also
31
posits their limited utility where some potential for enforcement is necessary.
Whatever its early successes, thus, Verdier casts the ultimate inadequacies of
the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy to have been grounded in the Basel
32
Committee’s inability to enforce its agreed terms.
Enforcement concerns do not present themselves, of course, when interests
are fully aligned. Transnational regulatory networks can readily facilitate the
pursuit of criminal enterprises that are illegal in all nations of interest, for
33
example. Monitoring and enforcement are unnecessary in such a circumstance.
In the many settings in which national interests are not so perfectly aligned, by
contrast, Verdier posits networks to be of limited efficacy. In Verdier’s account,
thus, networks are only useful where relevant “standards and procedures . . . are
beneficial to all states” and entail nothing more than “uncontroversial technical
34
solutions.”
In advancing these overlapping critiques of transnational regulatory
networks, Brummer and Verdier each rely on the lessons of game theory. In
their view, game theory helps to suggest both when regulatory networks might
be useful and, more importantly, the far wider range of circumstances in which
they have little to offer. Brummer thus accuses transgovernmentalists of
focusing too singularly on transnational interactions that can be understood as
35
coordination games—and specifically as so-called Assurance games. In these
settings, including those in which information asymmetry and lack of trust are
the primary barriers to harmonization in financial regulation, each party would
prefer to invest the time and resources necessary for coordination at an optimal

30. See generally id.
31. See id. at 125–26.
32. See id. at 137–38.
33. See id. at 123.
34. Id. at 115.
35. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330. Among the most common Assurance games is the Stag
Hunt game. See id. In Stag Hunt, the players can collectively choose to hunt a stag, in hopes of securing
the greater rewards of doing so. But each player can alternatively (and more predictably) catch hare
alone. This dynamic generates the following payoffs (with the relevant equilibria marked by asterisks):
Hunt Stag

Hunt Hare

Hunt Stag

(4,4)*

(-1,1)

Hunt Hare

(1,-1)

(1,1)*

In this setting, each player would prefer to coordinate around joint pursuit of the stag. But if they fear
the other hunter may fail to adopt that strategy, or may abandon it at the first sight of a hare, each does
better to abandon the stag hunt himself, and at least have some rabbit for dinner. Id.
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36

Nash equilibrium. In the absence of relevant information about the likely
conduct of their counterpart, or a lack of trust, however, each is also
37
incentivized to avoid being the sucker and embracing a higher standard alone.
The resulting risk is coordination around the suboptimal Nash equilibrium—a
weaker standard or no standard at all—with lower investment by each national
38
regulator, and lower social and individual returns.
Although transnational regulatory networks can be helpful in resolving such
Assurance games, Brummer argues that information asymmetry and mistrust
39
are not the most crucial barriers to regulatory alignment in most cases. Rather,
the aforementioned divergences in regulatory philosophies and in adjustment
40
costs, as well as jurisdictional competition, are the true obstacles of concern.
In these settings, the dynamic is not that of an Assurance game, but rather
41
that of the Battle of the Sexes. In the Battle of the Sexes, players continue to
prefer a coordinated result. Each, however, prefers coordination at a different
42
Nash equilibrium. Given this added element of conflicting preferences,
Brummer suggests, transnational regulatory networks cannot facilitate
43
coordination effectively. Rather, when the Battle of the Sexes characterizes
the relationship among national financial market regulators, more coercive and
44
exclusive structures become necessary.

36. See id. at 344. Nash equilibria are those results from which no player will deviate, absent a
change in the payoffs or the strategy choice of other players. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 876 (2003).
37. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 344.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 330, 345.
40. See id. at 350–53.
41. See id. at 345. In the Battle of the Sexes, husband and wife each wishes to spend an evening
together, but they have different preferences as to where they would like to spend it. The payoffs are
thus as follows:
Ballet

Boxing

Ballet

(5,3)*

(1,1)

Boxing

(-1,-1)

(3,5)*

Row player (let us assume the wife) would prefer to attend the ballet rather than boxing, but would
rather attend boxing with her husband, than the ballet alone. Symmetrically, column player (the
husband) would rather see a boxing match, but would choose the ballet over going to boxing by
himself. Id.
42. Even among regulators equally committed to robust access to capital, for example, one might
expect divergent preferences as to the necessary scope of disclosure, depending on their national firms’
relative reliance on the capital markets versus bank financing. Id. at 350. Varying adjustment costs,
especially where relevant financial regulations implicate corporate governance structures, may be to
similar effect. Id. at 351.
43. See id.
44. Brummer further invokes game theory in his suggestion that the regulation of systemic risk,
given its extraterritorial effects and the consequent alignment of national-level incentives associated
with it, constitutes a relatively pure coordination game. Brummer, supra note 7, at 363.
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To related effect, Verdier sorts the operative dynamics at work in
international financial regulation into three clusters of games: pure
coordination games, Battle of the Sexes games, and Prisoner’s Dilemma games.
Pure coordination arises in situations that involve information dissemination,
the development of best practices, and the establishment of regulatory
45
frameworks where they have not existed before. These situations are relatively
uncommon, or at least fairly limited in scope, yet it is here that transnational
regulatory networks such as IOSCO and the Basel Committee have the greatest
46
potential to play a role, in Verdier’s account. Because these situations do not
involve any meaningful divergence in interests, preferences, or priorities, they
47
do not necessitate formal or coercive institutions, and networks will suffice.
By contrast, Verdier does not see a role for networks where distributional or
enforcement concerns exist, given the distinct game dynamics that arise in that
circumstance. Distributional issues, to begin, give rise to a Battle of the Sexes
48
game. Given their divergent preferences, each player seeks the embrace of his
own preferred equilibrium, even though the players agree, at least at some
level, on the desired ends. By holding out, Verdier suggests, each hopes the
49
other might eventually come over to his side. Some such dynamic might be
expected to play out in any effort to harmonize the substantive antitrust rules
governing resale price agreements, for example, as distinct from the
50
aforementioned coordination of antitrust enforcement.
Even more problematic are situations in which there is a need for
enforcement. Even after reaching agreement, parties may face the temptation
to defect from that agreement in pursuit of immediate gains, as in individual
nations’ use of technical barriers to limit the effect of multilateral trade
51
agreements. Similarly, in financial regulation, a given regulatory authority
might consider reneging on a securities enforcement memorandum of
understanding that mandates information exchange upon receipt of its
52
counterpart’s data. This, of course, is the classic dynamic of the Prisoner’s

45. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 167. As tested on Schelling’s students more than a half-century
ago, the “Meeting Place” dynamic of pure coordination manifests itself in the desire of two friends,
separated in New York City with no means of communication, to find each other. See THOMAS
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 56 (1981). Needing to determine both a time and place to
meet, both must engage in an exercise in recursive expectations, in which each tries to determine where
the other will expect him to expect her to expect him to expect her to look for him, ad infinitum. Id.
46. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 123. Among other examples, Verdier cites the coordination of
enforcement actions against a mutually criminalized transnational cartel and joint efforts to curtail
money laundering as falling within this range. See id. at 123, 167.
47. See id. at 123.
48. See generally Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities
Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 61 (1999) (describing the Battle of the Sexes).
49. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 124.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 125.
52. See Eduard H. Cadmus, Revisiting the SEC’s Memoranda of Understanding: A Fresh Look, 33
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1800, 1849 (2010).
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53

Dilemma. To avoid that game’s familiar pathologies, in turn, some alteration
in the operative payoffs is needed—a change that transnational regulatory
54
networks are not empowered to impose.
As part III demonstrates, a game theoretic account of international financial
regulation turns out to be more complex than the accounts of Brummer and
Verdier suggest. Conflicting interests need not give rise to a dynamic of
55
defection, nor to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which reflects that incentive. The
conflict that characterizes the Battle of the Sexes, meanwhile, involves far
greater alignment of interests than Brummer or Verdier acknowledge.
Ultimately, conflict may be fully consistent with a game of coordination, and
hence, with a role for transnational regulatory networks in international
financial regulation.
III
RECONCILING COORDINATION AND CONFLICT IN GAME THEORY
By invoking game theory to question the importance of transnational
networks in international financial regulation, the foregoing critiques are
correct in their starting point: in its most basic form, the dynamic of
coordination takes the form of a pure coordination game. As exemplified in
Schelling’s famous Meeting Place game, such pure coordination involves no
56
element of varying interests, differing preferences, or conflict. What the critics
of transnational regulatory networks overlook, however, is the persistence of
coordination even with the introduction of conflict.
A. The Dynamics of Coordination
To understand the flaw in the criticisms of transnational regulatory
networks, it is useful to start with coordination in its pure form. At heart, what

53. The payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are as follows:

Stay Silent

Stay Silent

Confess

(1,1)

(10,0)

Confess
(0,10)
(5,5)*
If both prisoners remain silent, they can only be convicted on (for example) a gun possession charge
carrying a sentence of one year. By offering each prisoner the opportunity to walk free if they confess
alone, however, the prosecutor can prompt both to do so, with the result that neither confession is
needed individually, and each prisoner ends up incarcerated for five years. The incentive to defect in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma—to confess—thus generates a socially “suboptimal” equilibrium.
54. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 125. Repeat plays are, of course, among the most important
means for solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
55. “[I]n analyzing international securities regulation, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a useful paradigm
in only a few of the problems that arise in practice.” Licht, supra note 48, at 65; see also Robert B.
Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 600–
07 (2010); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and
Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009).
56. See SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 56 (describing the Meeting Place game task of finding one’s
friend in New York City, without the ability to communicate).
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made Thomas Schelling’s Meeting Place game interesting—or uninteresting, as
the case may be—was that its solution lay not in changing the incentives of the
57
players, but simply in shaping their expectations. In seeking to locate one’s
friend in New York, thus, there is no flaw in either individual’s incentives, or in
their collective ones. Nor is there any issue of trust. Rather, the obstacle to
effective coordination is each friend’s inability to develop confident
expectations of what their friend will do. This constitutes the essential point of
contrast between a coordination game, be it the pure coordination dynamic of
the Meeting Place game or any number of more conflictual coordination games,
and the Prisoner’s Dilemma and other games not characterized by coordination.
In the conflictual Prisoner’s Dilemma, the motivating challenge is the
players’ incentive to defect. Given the payoff structure, both players in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma are incentivized to abandon a socially optimal outcome in
favor of an equilibrium that is both socially and individually inferior. Critically,
this incentive exists independent of the strategy played by the other player. Each
player thus has a dominant strategy of defection—that is, confession—
regardless of whether his counterpart chooses to remain silent or to confess.
Displacing the parties’ dominant strategy thus becomes the essential response
to a Prisoner’s Dilemma–like payoff structure.
By contrast, the challenge in the Meeting Place and other coordination
games is not the presence of a dominant strategy and the resulting expectation
of defection. Rather, the challenge is the presence of multiple Nash equilibria:
multiple strategy combinations that are interdependent in their payoffs, and
that neither party will have reason to abandon, once they are established. Each
player’s preferred strategy in a coordination game thus depends on the strategy
played by the other. Yet they may fail to coordinate around aligned strategies,
given the presence of multiple potential equilibria from which to choose.
Given the distinct challenges that underlie coordination games and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the means to those ends might likewise be expected to
differ. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma and similar settings, law and regulation are
drawn upon to alter the incentives of relevant players. By changing the
operative payoffs, legal interventions eliminate the incentive to defect—be it in
58
environmental law, securities regulation, or elsewhere.
While one could address coordination games in a similar fashion as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the natural solution lies elsewhere. At least in the first
instance, coordination games need not be solved by altering the incentives of
the relevant players. Why? Because in a coordination game, the incentives of
57. See Raustiala, supra note 1, at 24; see also Verdier, supra note 7 (describing the Meeting Place
game).
58. Issue linkage often serves as a means to alter payoffs in international relations, including
payoffs in international financial regulation. See Licht, supra note 48, at 89; see also id. at 91–92
(comparing the capacity of the European Union versus IOSCO to navigate the Prisoner’s Dilemma).
When the relevant payoffs generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma, institutions with cross-substantive
jurisdiction may be able to reduce the incentive to defect, by linking any such defection to the
imposition of costs in other areas of necessary cooperation.
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the parties are not (at least inherently) the source of any coordination failure
that might occur, or of the parties’ coordination around a suboptimal result.
Rather, any such failure turns on their expectations—or, more precisely, on
their inability to develop accurate expectations of one another. If I cannot
predict where you will expect me to expect you to expect me to go, and so on,
we may end up meeting further away than necessary. Worse, we may not find
59
each other at all.
From this, it becomes easy to see why transnational regulatory networks
might be an attractive tool for facilitating optimal coordination. With their
noncoercive, information-oriented, and expertise-driven nature, transnational
networks seem well suited to shaping expectations at the heart of any
coordination game in transnational regulation. On the other hand, it is equally
easy to see why one might question the capacity of networks once conflict is
present. If relevant national regulators’ preferences diverge, one might expect
transnational regulatory networks’ primary focus on information generation
and dissemination, their inability to coerce, and their lack of meaningful
political power to render them fairly ineffective tools to resolve the conflict.
As it turns out, however, coordination is a more complex phenomenon than
consideration of the Meeting Place game above might suggest. The same
centrality of expectations and information that supports a place for networks in
nonconflictual settings turns out to favor a role for them even when conflict is
added to the mix. Understanding this requires consideration of the broader
universe of coordination games.
B. Coordination and Conflict
From its origins, the study of coordination in game theory was primarily
focused on conflict. Thomas Schelling, the leading expositor of coordination
game theory in the economics literature, widely disseminated that work in his
60
seminal, and Nobel Prize-recognized, book, The Strategy of Conflict. “To study
the strategy of conflict,” he wrote, “is to take the view that most conflict
situations are essentially bargaining situations. They are situations in which the
ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree
61
on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make.”
Schelling’s ultimate focus, thus, was not how friends might find each other in
New York City, but rather how to understand the then-raging Cold War. More
59. One might thus see the operative task in coordination games as two-fold: At a minimum, the
goal is to avoid coordination failure. In the Meeting Place game, players hope to get to some common
location rather than be separated. Beyond that, however, where one equilibrium is Kaldor–Hicks
preferable to the other, the goal is get players to the optimal coordination point. See Matthew D. Adler
& Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost–Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 190 (1999) (distinguishing
Kaldor–Hicks and Pareto efficiency). In the Meeting Place game, for example, meeting closer to both
players’ starting point would be preferable to the alternative meeting point.
60. See SCHELLING, supra note 45; see also DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY (1969).
61. SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 5.
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specifically, his concern was how to avoid that war turning hot:
Viewing conflict behavior as a bargaining process is useful in keeping us from
becoming exclusively preoccupied either with the conflict or with the common
interest. To characterize the maneuvers and actions of limited war as a bargaining
process is to emphasize that, in addition to the divergence of interest over the
variables in dispute, there is a powerful common interest in reaching an outcome that
is not enormously destructive of values to both sides. A “successful” employees’ strike
is not one that destroys the employer financially, it may even be one that never takes
62
place. Something similar can be true of war.

The examples of coordination dynamics explored by Schelling are similarly
telling. In Schelling’s account, the decision not to use chemical weapons during
World War II, or atomic weapons during the Korean War, can be understood as
exercises in coordination. Even clearer is his reference to the recurrent
resolution of military conflicts along the lines of physical boundaries, including
the river that ran along the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, and the straits
63
separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland. Such a boundary, Schelling
suggested, has significant capacity to shape expectations in conflict settings:
If some troops have retreated to the river . . . , they will expect to be expected to make
a stand. This is the one spot to which they can retreat without necessarily being
expected to retreat further, while, if they yield any further, there is no place left where
they can be expected to make a determined stand. Similarly, the advancing party can
expect to force the other to retreat to the river without having his advance interpreted
as an insatiable demand for unlimited retreat. There is stability at the river—and
64
perhaps nowhere else.

This emphasis on the overlap of conflict and coordination in limited war,
and in conflict situations more broadly, can be seen in the standard-form
65
coordination games that introduce elements of conflict. In the “limited war” of
the Battle of the Sexes, of course, the interests of the spouses are in self-evident
66
conflict. Each one seeks coordination on his or her terms. And given as much,
each is incentivized to bluff—and even lie—to get his or her way. Ultimately,
however, the exercise remains one of coordination—with multiple equilibria,
interdependent strategies, and a central role for mutual expectations. If the
husband expects his wife to choose her preferred location in the end, he will go
there as well.
An even more extreme dimension of conflict can be seen in the Hawk–Dove
game, in which each party prefers to play hawk, to the other party’s dove. In
this coordination game, most commonly captured in the infamous game of
“Chicken,” two drivers race toward each other, with each determined not to

62. Id. at 5–6.
63. See id. at 75–76.
64. Id. at 71.
65. Other coordination games with an element of conflict might also be identified. Cf. McAdams,
supra note 55, at 226–27. But this article focuses on the standard-form games that are most commonly
cited.
66. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330 (defining the Battle of the Sexes); see also supra note 41
(same).
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67

swerve. One prevails when he continues on unflinchingly, while the other
swerves. The element of conflict could thus not be more acute.
Yet the fundamental dynamic even in this conflict-laden game remains one
of coordination. As in other coordination games, we see multiple equilibria.
They are inverted strategies, to be sure, in which coordination occurs by our
choice of opposite strategies. As with other Nash equilibria, though, the
interdependence of our strategies renders any unilateral shift undesirable. If
one driver is going to swerve, his opponent has no incentive to alter his strategy
of continuing forward. If a given driver is not going to swerve, meanwhile, his
opponent likewise has no incentive but to swerve. The “solution” to the Hawk–
Dove game, as a result, continues to turn on our expectations of one another.
Depending on what each player expects of his counterpart, he will set his
68
strategy accordingly.
Conflict is fully consistent, then, with coordination. The operative concern
in both the Battle of the Sexes and Hawk–Dove games remains a failure of
coordination—including potential coordination at a suboptimal equilibrium (if
the payoffs were altered to include some Kaldor–Hicks efficiency ranking as
between attendance at the ballet versus boxing, or in the emergence of one or
the other player as the hawk). More significantly, there is no issue of defection
69
in either game. Once a player expects a certain equilibrium to emerge, they
have no reason to defect from it. The husband prefers to go to the ballet with
70
his wife, than to go to a boxing match alone. And in the Hawk–Dove game, it
71
is better to be the chicken than to be dead. The introduction of conflict, then,
need not negate a dynamic of coordination. So long as any such conflict does
not alter the players’ ultimate preference for coordination over the alternatives,
72
the game to be played may remain one of coordination.
67. The resulting payoffs are as follows:
Swerve
Swerve

(2,2)

Continue

(10,0)*

Continue
(0,10)*
(-10,-10)

68. One might include the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) game in this enumeration as well. See
Brummer, supra note 7. The Stag Hunt captures not conflict per se, or even a lack of trust, but rather a
lack of assurance that one’s counterpart will fulfill his part of the bargain. Notably, Brummer and
Verdier do not seem to question the ability of networks to help navigate Assurance game dynamics.
69. See Licht, supra note 48, at 101.
70. See id. (“[T]here is no compelling need for any strong enforcement mechanism [in the Battle
of the Sexes], because once an agreement is reached, it is self-enforcing.”).
71. For either player in the matrix in note 67, the prospect of no payoff (0) is superior to the
negative payoff of the southeast quadrant (-10).
72. That Verdier’s conception of coordination excludes such conflictual dynamics is suggested by
his focus on pure coordination. He thus emphasizes that in pure coordination games, “the optimal
outcome is self-sustaining.” Verdier, supra note 7, at 123. In point of fact, that is true of any
coordination game. To similar effect is his reference to situations in which “mere coordination” is
needed. See id. at 168 (emphasis added). Brummer is broader in his conception of coordination; he
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In Verdier’s framework, the existence of “distributional” concerns—and the
resulting conflict between the relevant national authorities—does not mean that
the operative dynamic is not still one of coordination. It is not one of pure
coordination, to be sure, but it may yet be a Battle of the Sexes game, and
73
hence still a coordination dilemma. Even enforcement concerns, for that
matter—where they fall short of incentivizing defection—may still involve a
multi-equilibrium coordination game. In the aforementioned dynamic of the
74
Stag Hunt game, thus, there are “enforcement” problems of a sort. Yet, as in
75
the Battle of the Sexes and Hawk–Dove, there is no incentive to defect. And
coordination thus remains the operative concern.
Stating the point more formally, strategies in Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes,
Hawk–Dove, and other coordination games remain interdependent. By contrast
with the dominant strategy that characterizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma—and
necessitates some coercive alteration in the payoffs to the parties, if a
suboptimal outcome is to be avoided—players’ strategy choices in these
coordination games continue to depend on the choices made by their
counterparts. Just as in the pure coordination setting of the Meeting Place
game, unless one changes what one does, one’s counterpart has no incentive to
do so. The introduction of conflict, as such, does not inevitably generate an
incentive to defect.
Of course, the payoff structure in a particular, real-world setting of
transnational regulation—whether conflictual or otherwise—may not be that of
a coordination game. Further, the introduction of conflict could alter payoffs in
a way that undermines any preexisting dynamic of coordination. At the
extreme, it could even generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma, or some other payoff
structure characterized by an incentive to defect. What is crucial, however, is
that there is no necessary exclusivity between coordination and conflict, even
76
when interests or preferences significantly diverge.
IV
THE ROLE OF NETWORKS IN CONFLICT
If transnational regulatory networks have a role to play in facilitating
acknowledges the nature of the Battle of the Sexes as a coordination dynamic. See Brummer, supra
note 7, at 330. Nonetheless, he describes settings characterized by a Battle of the Sexes dynamic as illsuited to coordination-driven approaches. See id. at 343–44 (describing networks’ role as limited to
situations where relevant parties have “similar objectives and preferences”).
73. Notably, Verdier casts distributional problems as giving rise to a Battle of the Sexes–type
dynamic, but then engages that setting as if it were entirely distinct from the coordination game setting
in which he sees networks to have their proper place. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 124.
74. See supra note 35 (describing payoffs in the Stag Hunt game).
75. Verdier wrongly equates enforcement problems with the risk of defection. See Verdier, supra
note 7, at 115.
76. In conflict-laden situations, Verdier suggests that national regulators may “hold out” in
negotiations. See id. at 124. In that, he is quite right. They can also be expected to bluff—even lie. The
critical point, however, is that the dynamic remains one of coordination, notwithstanding those
countervailing incentives.
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coordination in the absence of conflict, the foregoing suggests that a similar role
might persist, even when conflict is present. How, then, might we expect
networks to facilitate coordination—whether in the absence or presence of
conflict? More precisely, after identifying four distinct ways in which
coordination might fail to occur, what are the ways in which transnational
regulatory networks might reduce the risk of failure?
Four forms of coordination failure can be identified. Two forms may occur
on the front end of any strategic interaction that necessitates coordination.
First, no coordination equilibrium may emerge: friends or spouses may end up
choosing different locations, one hunter may pursue stag while the other
pursues hare, both cars may swerve or even collide, or trading across exchanges
may be hampered by incompatible pricing or other standards. Second, even
when players do successfully coordinate, they may do so around a relatively
77
inefficient equilibrium.
A third potential risk—inefficient lock-in—compounds the second. Once a
given coordination equilibrium has emerged, it may be difficult to displace it,
however suboptimal it may be. Given the lack of incentive to unilaterally defect
from any Nash equilibrium in a coordination game—notwithstanding the gains
78
to mutual adjustment—such changes in strategy may not occur. Hence the
stubborn persistence of suboptimal standards in many industries, even in the
face of preferable alternatives.
Finally, delays in the emergence of new innovations and entire markets are
a fourth potential form of coordination failure. Given the various risks of noncoordination, suboptimal coordination, and lock-in, the force of inertia may be
strong at the outset of any coordination game. Unsure of what equilibrium may
emerge—whether an efficient or inefficient one, or an otherwise preferred or
disfavored one—and fearful of the (potentially costly) prospect of noncoordination, players may simply choose not to play the game.
How, then, are these various forms of coordination failure to be avoided?
As with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, an effort might be made to alter players’
incentives in coordination game settings, whether by legal decree or otherwise.
Such changes are not necessary, however, given the genesis of each of these
potential failures not in the incentives of the parties, but rather in their inability
to develop accurate expectations of one another.
To avoid coordination failure, thus, each party to a coordination game must
effectively determine what the other player is likely to expect of him. As
Schelling describes it, “What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read
the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action

77. In the payoffs structures offered above, this cannot occur, given the corresponding payoffs to
each equilibrium. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which one equilibrium may be Kaldor–
Hicks preferred to the other, however. In those cases, coordination at the lesser equilibrium constitutes
coordination failure of a particular sort.
78. For discussion of the possibility that communication may not effectively alleviate such lock-in
effects, see Ahdieh, supra note 55, at 613–16.
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that their expectations of each other can converge on. They must ‘mutually
recognize’ some unique signal that coordinates their expectations of each
79
other.”
80
Critical to this task, in Schelling’s account, are so-called “focal points.”
Where two friends seek to find each other in New York, a certain location, be it
Grand Central Station or elsewhere, may be a focal point for decision. For
spouses, the location of their last date might similarly be focal, whether it
suggests a return to the ballet, or just the opposite. And for two boys racing
toward each other in their cars, the question of who swerved last time may be
focal in shaping their expectations. The “salience” of some given outcome, thus,
81
can help to align the parties’ expectations.
If the shaping of expectations—perhaps especially by way of defining focal
points for decision—is the key determinant of efficient coordination, can
transnational regulatory networks contribute to that process? In a number of
respects, transnational networks are especially well suited to doing so. To begin,
optimal coordination will often turn on the collection, compilation, and
dissemination of key information. The more a player knows, the more accurate
he is likely to be in his evaluation of his counterpart’s likely choices. If there is
any task for which transnational networks have been seen to be well suited, it is
just such gathering and sharing of information. IOSCO’s generally praised
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, for example, can be seen in this
82
light. By identifying (and ultimately addressing) key differences in
enforcement, the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding has fostered
significant improvements in the quality of cooperation in securities law
enforcement.
Beyond factual information per se, the shaping of expectations will often
turn on relevant actors’ sense of one another. Greater familiarity thus enhances
one’s capacity to develop an accurate judgment about what is likely to be focal
to another. With their orientation to not simply recurrent, but ongoing and
relatively low-stakes, engagement among participants, transnational regulatory
networks provide an ideal mechanism for increased familiarity and
socialization—and the increased accuracy of expectations that might be
83
expected to follow from it. To related effect, one might think of transnational
79. SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 54.
80. See id. at 57–58.
81. See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 89–90
(1986).
82. See Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry
Networks, AM. J. INT’L. L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 28–29) (on file with author); see also
Antonio Marcacci, IOSCO: The World Standard Setter for Globalized Financial Markets, 12 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 23, 27 (2012).
83. See Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 575, 611 (2009); Raustiala, supra note 1, at 55; Anne–Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a
Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 314 (2004); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational
Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1002 (2007); cf. Eric J. Pan,
Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond
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regulatory networks as an institutional framework for repeat plays. Such
iteration is most commonly highlighted as a solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In the work of Robert Axelrod and others, for example, players’ dominant
strategies of defection were effectively displaced when each could credibly
84
threaten retaliation in a future play.
Given the role of accurate expectations in the avoidance of coordination
failures, repeated interactions may potentially be useful in coordination game
settings as well. Each time the relevant game is played, each player gains
enhanced insight into what to expect of his counterpart. By offering a forum for
85
such recurrent engagement, networks may be useful in facilitating efficient
86
coordination.
A final way in which transnational regulatory networks may play a role in
shaping expectations stems from the fact that coordination games in
transnational settings will usually be multiplayer rather than two-party games.
Most commonly, a given player’s strategy will be a function of what he expects
of a multiplicity of other players. And the same will be true of each of the other
players. As one seeks to develop accurate expectations of another, then, the
signals he is receiving from others may be critical—given that his strategy can
be expected to depend on what he expects of each of them. Transnational
networks’ agglomeration of broader collections of market participants may
consequently be valuable in bringing together the various sources of
87
expectation in question.
None of this changes when we add conflict to the mix. If transnational
regulatory networks can help us adopt a common disclosure standard when we
agree, it may also do so when we differ, for example, in our preference for U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles versus International Financial
Reporting Standards. So long as we prefer a common accounting standard, even
Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 252–53 (2010) (noting the role of repeat
interactions in G-7, G-20, and similar national groupings); Whitehead, supra note 3, at 704–05 (citing
relationship-building and professional socialization among characteristics of transnational regulatory
networks). On the role of familiarity in coordination settings, see SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 57–58;
Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 16, at 539–40.
84. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984). In recent years,
strategies besides Axelrod’s tit-for-tat have been identified as solutions in repeat play Prisoner’s
Dilemma games. See, e.g., KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT II: JUST
PLAYING 313–19 (1998).
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. In earlier work, I have argued that the longevity of an institution or network may impact its
ability to facilitate coordination. See Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 16, at 539–41. The
contributions of an older institution may thus be relatively more salient. The point above is a distinct
one. By virtue of greater experience with each other, network participants may be better able to
develop accurate expectations of one another. Cf. Licht, supra note 48, at 89–91, 93 (describing the
European Union’s progressive work on disclosure rules, over an extended period of time and noting
potential for IOSCO’s modest successes over time to impact its ability to succeed in more ambitious
undertakings).
87. Cf. Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial
Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 157, 167 (2013) (suggesting role of “composition” of network in
determining its impact).

AHDIEH_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2015]

COORDINATION AND CONFLICT

1/14/2016 1:22 PM

93

if that standard is yours versus mine, expectations remain the key determinant
88
of the result. If any given national regulator expects others to adopt its less
favored standard, it will embrace that standard as well, as predicted by the
Battle of the Sexes.
In what ways, then, might transnational regulatory networks help to
facilitate coordination in the face of conflict? At a minimum, networks offer a
forum for members to signal one another as to the strength of their intention to
89
stick to their guns. As with Schelling’s account of limited war, each player can
utilize the network platform to forcefully assert his unwillingness to abandon his
preferred course. Beyond mere assertion, networks offer a natural opportunity
for nations to signal as much, by way of the provision of key information
indicative of their commitment. More generally, like the river in Schelling’s
90
account of military conflict, regulatory networks may facilitate players’ efforts
91
to render focal their preferred outcome. By promoting their position in a
network forum, parties may increase the salience of their preferences, and
thereby shift expectations to their advantage.
By contrast with bilateral interactions among players with conflicting
interests, transnational regulatory networks create opportunities to engage
other network participants in ways that may impact the accounting or other
92
standard around which national regulators ultimately coordinate. As noted
above, participation in network fora may help members develop more accurate
93
expectations of the likely behavior of other network participants. But if one’s
goal, given conflicting interests, is not merely to predict the ultimate
equilibrium, but to shape it, networks may be even more useful. Thus, if one
hopes to influence the expectations of a particular counterparty as to one’s
commitment to one’s preferred standard, one powerful way to do so is through
the behavior of yet other network participants. Where other members of the
88. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s gradual embrace of International Financial
Reporting Standards, as their likelihood of market dominance became progressively clearer and
clearer, is suggestive of this pattern. That its embrace followed years of forceful resistance may be even
more telling. See William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting
Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (2010).
89. See Gadinis, supra note 87, at 167.
90. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
91. Verdier acknowledges the role of focal points in coordination games. See Verdier, supra note
7, at 129. Yet he seems to see their role as limited to pure coordination settings. See id. Brummer, by
contrast, does not directly engage the role of focal points or salience. In the face of conflict, he suggests
that “[c]oordination depends on other factors, like the order of play . . . . If, as is often the case, players
move simultaneously, the result would be undeterminable and additional negotiations would be
necessary.” Brummer, supra note 7, at 354. Those are precisely the circumstances in which focal points
may determine the result.
92. See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 795–96
(2014); Raustiala, supra note 1, at 25, 27; cf. Michael S. Barr, Who’s In Charge of Global Finance?, 45
GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 1002–03 (2014) (noting concerns about biases arising from the particular
membership of a network); Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54
INT’L ORG. 1 (2000); David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 573–74 (2008).
93. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
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network embrace one’s preferred standard, or even abandon one’s competitor’s
standard for one’s own, a strong impact on any given counterparty’s
expectations is to be expected.
The enumeration to this point suggests ways in which transnational
regulatory networks might serve a useful role for national regulators playing a
Battle of the Sexes game over their preferred standards. But one might also
identify potential contributions of networks in even more conflictual settings.
Transnational networks might help to define the boundaries of authority as
multiple national regulators compete to assert their jurisdiction over a given
complex transaction, for example. Assuming a standard public choice dynamic,
each regulator might be expected to assert its jurisdiction, even while
recognizing that duplicative exercises of jurisdiction would prove mutually
harmful. In this Hawk–Dove dynamic, each national regulator seeks to press its
94
claim, but only to the extent its counterpart, playing dove, will defer.
The assertion of jurisdiction is likewise an exercise in shaping expectations,
for which purpose transnational regulatory networks may prove a helpful tool.
This utility arises for the same reason it does when regulators compete over
alternative standards. Especially given the self-evidently rhetorical exercise
entailed in Hawk–Dove-style interactions, in fact, networks may be even more
useful here than in Battle of the Sexes–style standards competitions. If a
national regulator’s goal is to shape another’s expectation as to whether it will
assert jurisdiction, one can readily see how the force of the regulator’s
expression in a network forum, dedicated to collective action, would be
relatively greater. By comparison with the regulator’s assertion of its intentions
in a one-off, bilateral interaction, the setting of a transnational regulatory
network setting may be especially useful for that purpose.
As the latter example highlights, the role of transnational networks in
conflictual settings may involve some significant dimensions of power, force,
and even “coercion” of a sort. In that regard, critiques of transnational
regulatory networks as involving the exercise of power by strong states is no
95
critique at all. Whereas the operation of network structures—like every
occasion for transnational engagement—is defined by the exercise of power and
influence, it is not ineffective or irrelevant for that reason.
Instead, the interesting question is how their role intersects with the
dynamics of relative national power. Consider, for example, the potential
utilization of transnational regulatory networks by historically strong states
96
whose influence is on the decline. As the power of U.S. financial market
94. Persistent elements of coordination may facilitate regulatory cooperation even where
something of a Prisoner’s Dilemma is at work. The successful coordination between banking authorities
in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg in navigating the failure of Dexia in 2008 exemplifies that
possibility. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 11–12 (Mar.
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
95. See Parella, supra note 92, at 795–96.
96. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s gradual shift away from unilateral assertions of
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regulators has waned over the last several decades with the rise of competing
financial centers in London, Tokyo, Germany, Hong Kong, and elsewhere, U.S.
financial regulators have relied to a far greater degree on transnational
97
98
regulatory networks. Why?
In significant part, the answer may lie in the coordination dynamic at work.
If the relational structure of regulatory networks permits more effective shaping
of expectations, they might be attractive policymaking tools in the face of a
nation’s declining ability to compel desired behavior. The same might be said of
the collective nature of networks, which may enable the formerly strong
regulator to leverage the expectations of any given national regulator to shape
the expectations of others.
But one might also see benefits of transnational regulatory networks for
nonhegemonic states in the presence of conflicting interests. For national
regulators with limited ability to force their position on others—be it their
choice of standard, their assertion of jurisdiction, or otherwise—transnational
networks might be attractive not only by virtue of their collective nature, but
also given their relational character and rhetorical orientation. The
opportunities for leverage arising from the relational character of transnational
99
regulatory networks, as described above, are fairly clear. As to the networks’
rhetorical orientation, even relatively weak network participants have the
opportunity to talk a big game in a network setting. And so long as the
operative dynamic remains one of coordination, that talk must be taken
100
seriously, or at least more seriously than it otherwise would be. By virtue of
the forcefulness and consistency of its assertions, buttressed by its engagement
with the network’s broad membership, a national regulator otherwise limited in
101
its influence may be empowered to shape outcomes in a network setting.
Amir Licht has suggested a final potential benefit of transnational
regulatory networks for relatively weaker states, in the face of conflicting
interests. Where coordination underlies the incentives of the parties—
notwithstanding distinct preferences in their choice of equilibrium—
exterritorial jurisdiction might be understood in this light. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 876–79 (2006). As early as the late 1980s, however, the Commission
began to express a preference for cooperative approaches. See Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation
by Enforcement: An International Perspective, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 310–20 (1990).
97. Cf. Brummer, supra note 7, at 332; Derek N. White, Conduct and Effects: Reassessing the
Protection of Foreign Investors from International Securities Fraud, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 81, 127
(2009).
98. Brummer suggests networks may be relatively less effective policy tools for the United States,
as its power declines. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 355. But in fact, as described above, they may be
especially useful, given that trend.
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. Of course, this might be true of bilateral assertions as well. One could imagine that the
network setting might be relatively more effective, however, as a vehicle for one state to influence the
expectations of others.
101. Brummer describes the various ways in which hegemonic powers may press for the embrace of
their preferred norms and standards. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 343. Networks may also sometimes
play a role, however, in helping nonhegemonic actors resist such pressures.
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transnational networks may offer a reputation-saving means for nations to
102
embrace a disfavored equilibrium. “[O]rganizations like IOSCO may []
facilitate cooperation . . . by helping the smaller player to save face
domestically. Thus, it may be considered more respectable to yield to IOSCO
103
than to the SEC.” To be sure, one could easily overstate the importance of
104
this role. At least in some circumstances, however, it may be of value.
Transnational regulatory networks have the capacity to play a significant
role in international relations, then, even in the face of power differentials,
distinct priorities, and divergent preferences. So long as relevant national
authorities benefit more from coordination than from pursuing their particular
preferences alone, networks can have an impact. That may be especially so in
international financial regulation, given transnational networks’ already
prominent place.
V
COORDINATION GAMES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
Having seen a variety of ways in which transnational regulatory networks
might facilitate coordination even in the face of conflict, it is useful to conclude
by considering the potential role of the networks in international financial
regulation more specifically. How might one expect the dynamics of
coordination and conflict to play out in international financial regulation—the
setting in which the role of transnational regulatory networks has been most
directly challenged—and what are the implications for that role?
At a minimum, transnational regulatory networks are expected to play a
valuable role when national financial regulators are in relative agreement.
There is widespread consensus as to the value of transnational networks in
105
information-sharing, a critical dimension of financial market regulation.
Important aspects of the work of IOSCO can clearly be understood in this light,
106
including the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding. The same can be
said of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and even the
Basel Committee, perhaps especially in its early years. Dating back to the
earliest days of regulatory networks’ emergence as significant players in
102. See Licht, supra note 48, at 97.
103. Id.
104. At least some networks might—based on their particular composition, the formality of their
jurisdiction, etc.—also be in a position to contribute by offering opportunities for issue linkage. Cf. id.
(suggesting potential role of issue linkage in the face of power differentials). One might, furthermore,
construct a definition of network structures that is broad enough to capture as much. See Verdier, supra
note 7, at 115–16, 118 (suggesting broader definition, in line with that offered by Anne-Marie Slaughter,
while seeming to apply a definition that leaves no room for issue linkage). While the possibility of such
issue linkage does not speak directly to the facilitation of coordination, it suggests that even when
conflict alters the payoffs of a coordination game into something in the nature of a Prisoner’s Dilemma,
networks might still have a role to play.
105. Cf. Brummer, supra note 7, at 343 (noting role of asymmetric information in international
relations).
106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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international financial regulation, the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors’ Recommendation Concerning Mutual Assistance, Cooperation,
107
and Sharing of Information played an important role. In fostering linkages
among national regulators and more active information exchange, the
Recommendation has helped regulators fulfill their duties more effectively and
108
efficiently.
Beyond information-sharing, transnational networks can play a role in the
establishment of common standards for disclosure, accounting practices, and
perhaps even enforcement, when relevant national regulators agree as to
applicable goals, the appropriate approach, or both. This may, for example, be
the dynamic with reference to important aspects of antifraud regulation.
There is relatively widespread transnational consensus around the view of
109
financial fraud as worthy of condemnation, and even prosecution. At least up
to a point, then, transnational regulatory networks can help to facilitate
coordination in the enforcement of antifraud regulation. Minimally, they may
110
help to reduce the transaction costs associated with such cooperation. Adding
a dimension of conflict to the mix, transnational regulatory networks can also
be useful when trust is lacking in the antifraud context. Thus, when assurances
of mutual commitment to some regulatory undertaking are important,
regulatory networks can help to generate that assurance.
Even assuming common recognition of antifraud regulation as beneficial,
each national regulator might legitimately worry about potential domestic
pressures on its counterpart regulators that could curtail the extent or the
quality of those counterparts’ enforcement activity. At a minimum, one might
be concerned about the prospect that foreign regulators will be distracted from
111
an agreed commitment. In such circumstances, the coordination dynamic of
the Stag Hunt, national regulators can be expected to seek some reassurance
112
from one another.
Transnational regulatory networks, in turn, can help to offer that assurance.
In particular, networks may do so by making the Pareto superior equilibrium
more focal. By facilitating, and even encouraging, signaling behavior directed to
the equilibrium of enforcement, transnational networks may help to increase
107. See Zaring, supra note 1, at 300. On the informational orientation of the Basel Committee, see
Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View From Basel, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 15, 22 (2006).
108. See Zaring, supra note 1, at 300–01.
109. See Licht, supra note 48, at 102–03; Verdier, supra note 7, at 113.
110. A similar account might be offered as to insider trading, when there is agreement as to the
common benefits of bilateral (and perhaps even unilateral) regulation and enforcement. See Licht,
supra note 48, at 117–18. There too, one might observe a Harmony game, in which networks play a
role—not necessarily in facilitating coordination, but simply in reducing transaction costs.
111. See id. at 111.
112. See id. at 109–10. Brummer explicitly acknowledges the role of networks in settings where
assurance is the key question. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330. For him, this is the dynamic at work
when it comes to the regulation of systemic risk. See id. at 331, 363. Even there, however, Brummer
sees so-called “governmental clubs” as more effective. See id.
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enforcement’s salience, and thereby increase the prospect of coordination
113
around it, among otherwise independent securities market regulators.
A similar dynamic might be expected to play out in insider trading
regulation, where the commitment to aggressive enforcement among national
114
regulators is far more attenuated. More specifically, the coordination dynamic
of the Stag Hunt may be especially likely to emerge there, given the willingness
of each national regulator to act against insider trading only if others are doing
so as well. In that case, each regulator fears playing the fool, enforcing insidertrading rules against domestic market participants while its counterpart
115
regulators fail to do so.
In this circumstance, transnational networks can serve as a source of
information about the relative level of national regulatory commitment across
the globe. The networks may also offer a relatively more credible setting for the
offering of appropriate assurances. To be sure, formal international institutions,
with uncommon but readily imagined coercive powers, could achieve these ends
more directly. Networks may suffice, however, given the coordination dynamic
116
at work.
The potential role of networks, however, does not end with situations in
which conflict arises solely from a lack of trust. Transnational regulatory
networks may also be useful in standard-setting, when relevant regulators
disagree as to the preferred standard. As Chris Brummer highlights, in many
circumstances national regulators may have distinct regulatory philosophies, the
adjustment costs to a shared standard may rest more heavily on one regulator
than another, or the benefits of adjustment may be asymmetrically
117
distributed. So long as a common standard remains preferable to each
regulator’s use of its own standard, however, networks can continue to play a
facilitative role.
Presentation standards for mandatory disclosures, as opposed to the
substantive disclosure obligations themselves, exemplify the potential for
113. Brummer offers a distinct framing of this dynamic, within which players’ degree of risk
aversion determines the likely equilibrium point. See id. at 344. In that account, networks may serve to
modify the level of perceived risk.
114. At the extreme, antifraud regulation also has the potential to exhibit this type of conflictual
dynamic. There may be double standards in various countries, for example, as to the regulation of
inbound versus outbound fraud. See Licht, supra note 48, at 109. There may even be disagreement as to
how bad fraud really is, or as to what particular conduct is problematic. See id. This too may generate a
Stag Hunt dynamic, in which assurances are needed—and can be facilitated by transnational regulatory
networks.
115. See id. at 118. This is especially likely to be the dynamic at work when one or both participants
are focused, at least in part, on their international ranking as a center of financial market activity. See
id.
116. See id. Licht also offers a distinct account of how a transnational regulatory network might
contribute in the insider trading context, where a weak state is committed to insider trading regulation,
even without mutual cooperation. In that circumstance, the network may permit issue linkage designed
to secure such cooperation. Alternatively, it may allow for face-saving adjustments in the weak state’s
policy choices. See id. at 121.
117. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 349–51.
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118

networks to play this harmonizing role. Harmonizing such standards is
119
especially crucial in the absence of capital market efficiency. Even with
efficient markets, however, harmonization can help to reduce transaction
120
costs. Yet the abandonment of distinct national standards, which have been
internalized into the human capital of a given jurisdiction, into relevant
educational and professional training programs, and into technological systems,
121
create “distributional” issues of some significance. Significant as they are,
however, such distributional concerns do not alter the underlying dynamic of
coordination. Each jurisdiction prefers to settle on a single presentation
standard for market disclosures, notwithstanding their disagreement as to the
particular choice.
What can transnational regulatory networks contribute in the face of this
Battle of the Sexes? One key contribution may be to render some particular
outcome relatively more focal. Transnational networks may do so directly, by
way of their dissemination and promotion of a particular presentation standard.
But they may also do so less explicitly, through their generation and distribution
of information more generally. The significant success of the International
Accounting Standards Board in fostering the harmonization of presentation
standards (and increasingly substantive standards), even notwithstanding
122
substantial U.S. resistance, relied on just these strategies.
Beyond their focal point function, transnational regulatory networks may
also play a role in the face of conflicting standard preferences by offering a facesaving means for national regulators who have previously embraced one
disclosure standard to shift to another, without the appearance of conceding
123
their sovereign prerogative to a competing sovereign. By comparison with the
latter, embrace of a standard articulated by a transnational network may be
relatively more palatable.
Ultimately, even when national regulators engage in active regulatory
competition, there may be a significant coordination dynamic at work and
hence a role for transnational regulatory networks to play. This is just the
dynamic, of course, in international financial regulation, with national
regulators competing aggressively for trading and other financial market
124
activity. When one appreciates the nature of that competition, however, the
118. See Licht, supra note 48, at 98. A similar account might be offered as to substantive antitrust
law, which Verdier cites as exemplary of this dynamic. Verdier, supra note 7, at 124.
119. See Licht, supra note 48, at 98.
120. See id. at 99.
121. See id. at 100 (describing investments associated with embrace of a given accounting standard
for those nations not already utilizing it).
122. See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH U. L.
REV. 59, 76–78 (2013). It bears emphasizing that the IASB stands apart from the regulatory networks
discussed herein, given its composition by private parties. See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global
Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 250–51 (2005).
123. See Licht, supra note 48, at 101–02.
124. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 352.
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continued relevance of networks becomes clear.
In the first order, regulatory competition in the international financial
markets tends to be over the standard for market activity, rather than in pursuit
125
of sharp differentiation. Thus, national regulators do not seek to render their
financial markets unique in some fashion. Rather, their goal is to be fully
integrated with the international financial markets. Thus, in their competition
with others over the applicable standard, what national regulators seek is the
embrace of their standard over some competing one. At the extreme, even
offshore financial centers do not seek to separate themselves from the financial
markets, but rather to attract those seeking the most forgiving regulatory
regime within those markets.
For the same reason, once any competition over the governing standard for
trading activity is resolved, few national regulators will have any incentive to
abandon it. Rather, regulatory competition then shifts to a competition within
the standard. Each regulator seeks to provide regulatory options that attract
business to its jurisdiction yet remain within the (however roughly defined)
parameters of the international financial markets as they have come to exist.
This is precisely the dynamic of coordination described above. With its
multiple equilibria, the centrality of expectations and focal points, and the
stickiness of whatever equilibrium ultimately emerges, regulation of the
international financial markets fits squarely within the realm of coordination
game dynamics. As such, those markets offer a natural setting for transnational
regulatory networks to play a role—however much conflict is also in play.
VI
CONCLUSION
In weighing the appropriate architecture of the international order, there
may be many good reasons to embrace alternatives besides transnational
regulatory networks. Especially in financial regulation and other areas in which
they already have a long track record, however, any shift away from such
networks should happen for the right reasons. And an asserted incapacity to
navigate conflict is not among those reasons.
Even in the face of conflict, thus, regulatory networks can play an important
role in international financial regulation and elsewhere. To be sure, networks
will not always be effective in that role. Nor will they always be the most
appropriate means to pursue goals of transnational coordination and
harmonization. For example, in certain circumstances, transnational networks
may not offer the speed of decisionmaking needed. Their capacity for
enforcement may also be inadequate in many situations.
Whatever deficiencies they may have, however, do not arise because of
conflicting interests among their participants. In fact, network structures may be
especially well-suited to navigate such conflicts—even by comparison with
125. Cf. id.
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formal international institutions. Given the dramatically higher barriers to the
creation of formal international institutions, meanwhile, their creation ought
not be assumed. In the years ahead, we should consequently expect
transnational regulatory networks to continue to play a central role.

